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Comment  William Pizer
Key decisions in public policy often come down to eﬀorts to weigh the costs 
and beneﬁ  ts of various alternatives. In order for such eﬀorts to be mean-
ingful, it is important to include all major sources of costs and beneﬁ  ts—
otherwise, what may appear to be a reasonable choice can turn out to be 
quite the opposite when a full accounting occurs. The question would then 
seem to be, what are the key categories of costs and beneﬁ  ts?
This could be the primary focus of Heal and Kunreuther, who turn their 
attention to a broad category of such costs and beneﬁ  ts—environmental 
assets and liabilities—in order to see if there are any lessons for current 
policymakers. Their chapter breaks down into two parts: ﬁ  rst, a review of 
environmental assets and accounting; and second, a review of environmen-
tal liabilities and insurance, with a particular emphasis on nuclear power. 
Each part oﬀers lessons for improving public policy decisions.
The ﬁ  rst section reviews a number of examples where environmental 
assets have or have not been valued. The Catskills provide signiﬁ  cant value 
to New York City in terms of their ability to cleanse and stabilize the ﬂ  ow 
of water to New York. Forests oﬀer value in terms of sequestered carbon 
dioxide that otherwise contributes to global climate change. Oil, gas, coal, 
and other mineral deposits have very clear market value. Soil provides agri-
cultural productivity. And the climate system, to date, has provided relatively 
stable climate and weather patterns that have allowed regions to develop and 
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specialize—such as Florida’s balmy weather or the Rockies’ extensive ski 
resorts. Among these, only the Catskills watershed and mineral resources are 
examples where natural assets have been recognized, valued, and addressed 
by economic decisions. Elsewhere, public policy has failed to value these 
assets with, over time, likely adverse economic consequences.
The second section shifts to liabilities. Some, like the Superfund program 
and nuclear plant liabilities, are relatively well deﬁ  ned. Others, like the costs 
of hurricanes and terrorist acts that are not privately insured, are much 
more opaque. A variety of diﬀerent approaches have evolved to deal with 
these liabilities, typically involving some notion of shared public-  private 
risk, as they do not satisfy the conditions for pure private insurability. The 
nuclear liability program, designed to cover the costs of a nuclear accident 
and deﬁ  ned by the Price- Anderson Act, is characterized by about $10 billion 
in pooled private liability. Yet, as the authors show, the potential liability 
may be ten to one hundred times that—liability that rests with the federal 
government. Because of the nature of the private insurance, both its size and 
structure, Heal and Kunreuther argue that plant operators have insuﬃcient 
incentive to pursue safer operations. In particular, they advocate a system of 
third-  party inspections coupled with insurance premiums linked to inspec-
tion results.
In this way, Heal and Kunreuther oﬀer some very speciﬁ  c advice: account 
for environmental assets and design insurance schemes to properly incentiv-
ize behavior. Consider public schemes when liabilities do not satisfy condi-
tions for insurability.
Yet while that advice could be the primary focus of the chapter, it is not. 
The ﬁ  rst line of the abstract states “[we] argue that the degradation of 
natural capital can lead to social risks which ultimately will end up to some 
degree as the responsibility of the Federal government.” A later statement 
drives home the point regarding Hurricane Katrina: “the public expects the 
Federal Government to step in and oﬀer restitution in situations such as 
Katrina.” This is a very important point: while the government may or may 
not seek to take action to preserve natural assets, to avoid liabilities, or to 
develop explicit insurance programs, it will always have liability.
In this way, many public policy choices that may seem to be about action 
or inaction—for example, regarding climate change—are really about action 
now versus action later. The same can be said for natural disaster risk, ter-
rorism, or encouraging nuclear power. The latter is a particularly interest-
ing case, as nuclear power itself represents a fundamental risk-  risk trade-
 o ﬀ—the risk of a nuclear accident versus the risk of climate change (which 
will be greatly increased without nuclear power). Here, we have choices both 
about how we will manage the nuclear risk and how we will balance it—
through more or less eﬀective public insurance subsidies—against climate 
change risk.
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strophic risk born by the Federal government that should be met with both 
suitable mitigation and appropriate insurance tools. The ambiguity of risk 
in this case—concerning both the likelihood and consequence of adverse 
events—is simply a reason private insurance against climate change will not 
arise. However, there is another view about the ambiguity of risk in this case. 
Recent work by Weitzman (2009), and consequent criticism by Nordhaus 
(2009), take the notion of catastrophic risk a step further—arguing that in 
extreme cases catastrophic risk can actually throw into question the entire 
apparatus of cost-  beneﬁ  t analysis.
Weitzman makes the point that conventional cost-  beneﬁ  t analysis relies 
on some notion that increasingly improbable and adverse events can, at 
some point, be neglected. Otherwise, our analysis becomes dominated by 
eﬀorts to estimate the likelihood and magnitude of increasingly rare and 
super- catastrophic events—eﬀorts that are highly speculative and eventually 
somewhat meaningless. Weitzman argues that this is precisely the case of 
global climate change, owing to the unprecedented level and rate of change 
in greenhouse gas concentrations, uncertainty about the potential of sig-
niﬁ  cant positive feedbacks, and no understanding of what a 10 or 20 degree 
temperature change really means. Nordhaus, meanwhile, argues that we 
can and should do our best to estimate the likelihood and consequence of 
various climate change outcomes and use that estimate to inform decision-
 making. That is, he assumes the probability of increasingly rare events fades 
more rapidly than the consequences of those events expand.
Weitzman is trying to make an extreme point—that in the case of cli-
mate change, conventional cost- beneﬁ  t analysis is overwhelmed by the cata-
strophic risk and it is unbounded, with the policy implication that we should 
do virtually anything to contain that risk. This reminds one of a high school 
debating tactic in the 1980s—the “nuclear option”—where each team would 
attempt to tie whatever side of an issue they were arguing against to an 
increased risk of nuclear war. Such an outcome would be catastrophic, and 
therefore must be avoided. But how does one know how much is enough?
A weaker version of Weitzman’s point is one where the cost- beneﬁ  t is over-
whelmed by the catastrophic risk, but is not unbounded. In Heal and Kun-
reuther’s analysis of a worst-  case nuclear accident, for example, damages 
could be on the order of a $1 trillion (what they refer to as “almost unthink-
able costs”). Such a risk might be enough to overwhelm the cost-  beneﬁ  t 
analysis of a $1 billion nuclear power plant, but it is not unbounded.
In some people’s minds, this is precisely the calculus—nuclear power is 
not worth it. Others are okay with nuclear power, perhaps owing to an ana-
lyst’s calculations that put the expected value much lower, eﬀorts to mitigate 
that risk through various measures, or a notion that this unknowable risk on 
the nuclear accident side has an equilibrating unknowable risk on the other 
side—perhaps the likely environmental consequences from climate change 
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All of this should be a bit humbling, particularly as regards climate 
change but also more generally for cost-  beneﬁ  t analysis with ambiguous 
risk. Cost-  beneﬁ  t analysis, and particularly analyses involving catastrophic 
risk, should not be viewed as a formulaic way to make decisions. It is a valu-
able part of the decision process—maybe the most valuable part. But, in the 
end, values and judgment play an extremely important role.
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